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By Barry Sookman †

Introduction

Findings of the Copyright Board 6

T

T

he Copyright Board cannot target persons who are
not users of copyright. For this reason, and because
Tariff 22 raised novel issues, the Board ordered that the
proceedings be broken down into two phases. Phase I
would determine which actions trigger liability under
the Act and which do not. The issues put before the
Board were the following:

he exponential growth of the Internet has raised
serious issues related to liability for copyright
infringement. Who should compensate authors and
publishers for the use of their works? What activities
constitute infringement? Are Internet intermediaries
such as Internet service providers (ISPs) liable for
infringement when they provide connectivity to subscribers, when they provide hosting services, or when
they use caching technologies? Where does infringement
occur? Is the scope of the Copyright Act 1 limited to acts
of infringement that occur wholly within Canada or
does the Act apply to acts that take place partly in
Canada and partly outside of Canada? In the SOCAN v.
Canadian Association of Internet Providers 2 case
(Tariff 22) the Supreme Court of Canada tackled these
questions.
The appeal to the Supreme Court arose out of a
tariff filed by SOCAN known as Tariff 22. This tariff was
filed in respect of the following licence:

1. What do ‘‘communication’’, ‘‘telecommunication’’, ‘‘public’’, and ‘‘musical work’’ mean in the
context of Internet transmissions?
2. When does a communication to the public occur
on the Internet?
3. Who communicates on the Internet? In particular, who can benefit from paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of
the Act?
4. When does the act of authorizing a communication on the Internet occur?
5. When does a communication on the Internet
occur in Canada? 7

For a licence to communicate to the public by telecommunication, in Canada, musical works forming part of
SOCAN’s repertoire, by a telecommunications service to
subscribers by means of one or more computer(s) or other
device that is connected to a telecommunications network
where the transmission of those works can be accessed by
each subscriber independently of any other person having
access to the service . . . 3

The Board answered these questions as follows:
1. A musical work is not communicated when it is
made available on a server.
2. A musical work is communicated by telecommunication when a server containing the work
responds to a request and packets are transmitted
over the Internet for the purpose of allowing the
recipient to see or hear the work.

SOCAN’s intention in filing the tariff was to collect
fees ‘‘by the entities that provide end users with access to
the telecommunication networks, provided, however,
that if some or all access providers are determined not to
be liable or otherwise do not pay the approved fees, then
the tariff should provide for payment of the fees by other
appropriate participants in the communication chain’’. 4
SOCAN’s intent, in other words, was to collect royalties
from Internet intermediaries rather than from content
posters or publishers of content, unless Internet
intermediaries were found not to be liable for infringement. 5

3. The public or private character of a communication over the Internet can be determined
according to established legal and jurisprudential
principles.
4. A communication need not be instantaneous or
simultaneous to be a communication to the
public.

†Barry Sookman is a partner in the Technology, Communications and Intellectual Property Group, McCarthy Tetrault, Toronto. He was co-counsel for
the appellants/respondents on cross-appeal in the Tariff 22 case before the Supreme Court of Canada.
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5. By making a work available, a person authorizes
its communication.

●

Second, when material requested by an Internet
user in Canada is stored on a server outside
Canada, does communication of that material
occur only at the location of the server from
which it is transmitted?

●

Third, can Internet intermediaries be required to
pay a royalty because they ‘‘authorize’’ the communication of music transmitted on the
Internet? In particular, does the operator of a
host server authorize the communication of
music that it is stored, or does an Internet access
provider authorize the communication of the
music requested by and transmitted to one of its
subscribers?

6. The person who made a work available communicates it when it is transmitted from any
server (host, cache, mirror).
7. Persons who can avail themselves of paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Act with respect to a given
communication of a work do not communicate
the work. Generally speaking, this includes all
entities acting as Internet intermediaries, such as
the ISP of the person who makes the work available, persons whose server acts as a cache or
mirror, the recipient’s ISP, and those who operate
routers used in the transmission.
8. An entity cannot claim the benefit of paragraph 2.4(1)(b) with respect to a given communication of a work if the relationships it entertains
with the person who made the work available
are such that it can be said to act in concert with
that person or if it does not confine itself to the
role of an Internet intermediary.
9. The person who creates an embedded hyperlink
to a work authorizes its communication. The
person who merely supplies a link that must be
activated by the user does not.
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10. Communications occur at the site of the server
from which the work is transmitted, without
regard to the origin of the request or the location of the original Web site. Therefore, to
occur in Canada, a communication must originate from a server located in Canada on which
content has been posted.
11. The communication triggered by an embedded
hyperlink occurs at the site to which the link
leads.
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12. The issue of whether an entity that provides
content outside Canada — with the intention
to communicate it specifically to recipients in
Canada — is actually communicating it in
Canada remains open. 8

Federal Court of Appeal Ruling 9

S

OCAN sought judicial review of the findings of the
Copyright Board. The issues in the review were the
following:
●

First, when material is transmitted on the
Internet, do the operator of the server on which
content is stored, and the entity supplying the
ultimate recipient with access to the Internet,
only provide ‘‘the means of telecommunication
necessary for another person to so communicate
the work ’’ within the meaning of paragraph 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act? 10

In considering the scope of the common carrier
exemption, the Federal Court of Appeal ruled that three
things must be established for an intermediary’s activity
to fall within paragraph 2.4(1)(b), and thus not attract
liability for infringing copyright by communicating a
work to the public by telecommunication. First, the
intermediary’s activities must amount to the provision of
‘‘the means of telecommunication’’; second, these means
must be ‘‘necessary’’ for enabling another person to communicate a work to the public; and third, the activities in
question must constitute the intermediary’s ‘‘only act’’
with respect to the communication.
Evans J.A., writing for the majority of the Court,
agreed with the Board that the word ‘‘means’’ is capable
of describing a wider range of services and equipment
than those provided by traditional common carriers, and
that it should not be given the narrow interpretation
urged by SOCAN. 11 The majority held, however, that ‘‘a
person provides only the means of telecommunication
necessary for another person to communicate when,
without that person’s activity, communication in that
medium of telecommunication would not be practicable or, in all probability, would not have occurred’’. 12
Applying this test, the Court expressed the opinion that
the Board erred in law when it held that an Internet
intermediary who caches material is thereby providing
the means necessary for another to communicate it.
According to the Court, the fact that a cache enhances
the speed of transmission and reduces the cost to the
Internet access provider did not render the cache a practical necessity for communication.
On the second issue, the Court disagreed with the
findings of the Board that for there to be a communication to the public in Canada, the communication had to
originate from a server located in Canada. The Court
held that a royalty may be made payable in Canada in
respect of communications by telecommunication that
have a real and substantial connection with Canada. 13
On the third issue, the Court agreed with the Board
that Internet intermediaries do not authorize a commu-
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nication, because they don’t have the right to control the
actions of users. 14

Issues in Appeal in the Supreme
Court

B
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y the time the case reached the Supreme Court of
Canada, the issues had been somewhat narrowed.
The key questions to be decided in the appeal and crossappeal were the following:
●
First, are ISPs liable to pay royalties to SOCAN
by reason only that they provide Internet access,
use caching facilities, and provide hosting services?
●
Second, does the common carrier exemption
apply to protect ISPs from liability?
●
Third, does the Copyright Act apply extra-territorially (e.g., is there liability if music is sent and
received in Canada, received by Canadians and
transmitted from abroad, or transmitted from
Canada to receivers abroad)?

Interpretation of Common Carrier
Exemption

I

n interpreting the scope of the common carrier
exemption, the Court generally agreed with the holdings of the Federal Court of Appeal, except with respect
to the issue of the interpretation of the word ‘‘necessary’’
in paragraph 2.4(1)(b). In this respect, the Court agreed
with the dissenting views expressed by Sharlow J.A. of
the Court of Appeal that the term ‘‘necessary’’ was to be
given a broader meaning and is satisfied if ‘‘the means
are reasonably useful and proper to achieve the benefits
of enhanced economy and efficiency’’. 15
The Court was critical of the test espoused by Evans
J.A. of the Federal Court of Appeal that protection is only
available ‘‘when, without that person’s activity, communication in that medium of telecommunication would
not be practicable or, in all probability, would not have
occurred’’. 16 According to the Supreme Court
This is a high eligibility test which could inhibit development of more efficient means of telecommunication.
SOCAN and others representing copyright owners would
always be able to argue that whatever the advances in the
future, a telecommunication could still have been practicable using the old technology, and that one way or the
other the telecommunication would ‘‘in all probability’’
have occurred. In my view, with respect, Evans J.A. has
placed the bar too high. 17

The Court also held that paragraph 2.4(1)(b) is not a
loophole but an important element of the balance struck
by the statutory copyright scheme. The section,
according to the Court,
finds its roots, perhaps, in the defense of innocent dissemination sometimes available to bookstores, libraries, news
vendors, and the like who, generally speaking, have no
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actual knowledge of an alleged libel, are aware of no circumstances to put them on notice to suspect a libel, and committed no negligence in failing to find out about the libel. 18

The paragraph was enacted by Parliament with the
intent of ensuring that liability would not be imposed
on intermediaries who supply software and hardware to
facilitate use of the Internet.
In the sphere of telecommunications, the paragraph
was intended to encourage intermediaries to make telecommunications possible and to prevent liability that
could chill such expansion. Parliament’s intent in this
regard is summarized in the following passages from the
Court’s reasons for decision:
Parliament has decided that there is a public interest in
encouraging intermediaries who make telecommunications
possible to expand and improve their operations without
the threat of copyright infringement. To impose copyright
liability on intermediaries would obviously chill that expansion and development, as the history of caching demonstrates. In the early years of the Internet, as the Board found,
its usefulness for the transmission of musical works was
limited by ‘‘the relatively high bandwidth required to
transmit audio files’’ (at p. 426) . . . The velocity of new
technical developments in the computer industry, and the
rapidly declining cost to the consumer, is legendary. Professor Takach has unearthed the startling statistic that if the
automobile industry was able to achieve the same performance-price improvements as has the computer chip industry,
a car today would cost under five dollars and would get
250,000 miles to the gallon of gasoline: see Takach, supra,
p. 21. Section 2.4(1)(b) reflects Parliament’s priority that this
entrepreneurial push is to continue despite any incidental
effects on copyright owners.
In the Board’s view, the means ‘‘necessary’’ under s. 2.4(1)(b)
were means that were content neutral and were necessary to
maximize the economy and cost-effectiveness of the
Internet ‘‘conduit’’. That interpretation, it seems to me, best
promotes ‘‘the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect’’ (Théberge,
supra, at para. 30) without depriving copyright owners of
their legitimate entitlement . . .
. . . by enacting s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Copyright Act, Parliament
made a policy distinction between those who abuse the
Internet to obtain ‘‘cheap music’’ and those who are part of
the infrastructure of the Internet itself. It is clear that Parliament did not want copyright disputes between creators and
users to be visited on the heads of the Internet
intermediaries, whose continued expansion and development is considered vital to national economic growth. 19

The Court observed that Parliament did not say
that the intermediaries are engaged in communication
of copyright content, but enjoy an immunity. Instead,
paragraph 2.4(1)(b) says that such intermediaries are
deemed, for purposes of the Copyright Act, not to communicate the work to the public at all. For the purposes
of paragraph 3(1)(f ) of the Act, Internet intermediaries
are not ‘‘users’’.
The Court went on to explain that paragraph 2.4(1)(b) shields from liability the activities associated with providing the means for another to communicate by telecommunication. These means, as the Board
found, ‘‘. . . are not limited to routers and other hardware.
They include all software connection equipment, con-
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nectivity services, hosting and other facilities and services
without which such communications would not
occur’’. 20 As a matter of legislative policy established by
Parliament, the Act ‘‘does not impose liability for
infringement on intermediaries who supply software
and hardware to facilitate use of the Internet’’. 21
According to the Court,
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So long as an Internet intermediary does not itself engage in
acts that relate to the content of the communication, i.e.
whose participation is content neutral, but confines itself to
providing ‘‘a conduit’’ for information communicated by
others, then it will fall within s. 2.4(1)(b). . . . To the extent
they act as innocent disseminators, they are protected by
s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Act. 22

In this respect, the Court agreed with the approach
of the Board, which had found that as long as the role of
an ISP in respect of any given transmission is limited to
providing the means necessary to allow data initiated by
other persons to be transmitted over the Internet, and as
long as the ancillary services it provides fall short of
involving the act of communicating the work or authorizing its communication, it should be allowed to claim
the exemption. The Court noted that this approach to
the liability of suppliers of technological infrastructure is
consistent with the approach taken by the Court in the
Electric Despatch Co. of Toronto v. Bell Telephone Co.
of Canada case, 23 with the Agreed Statement of Facts in
Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, 24 and with the
approach of the European Union in clause 42 of the
E-Commerce Directive. 25
In refusing to find Internet intermediaries liable for
providing the means to enable others to communicate
works to the public, the Court drew a distinction
between the conduit status of an Internet intermediary,
which does not attract liability, and other functions that
an Internet intermediary can perform, such as acting as a
content provider, or creating embedded links that automatically precipitate a telecommunication of copyrighted music from another source, which can attract
liability. ‘‘In such cases, copyright liability may attach to
the added functions. The protection provided by
s. 2.4(1)(b) relates to a protected function, not to all of the
activities of a particular Internet Service Provider’’. 26
The Court held that the conduit status of an
Internet intermediary applies as long as the Internet
intermediary does not itself engage in acts that relate to
the content of the communication (i.e., whose participation is content neutral), but confines itself to providing
‘‘a conduit’’ for information communicated by others.
However, the presence of knowledge of the infringing
nature of a work on the part of an ISP would, according
the Court, be a factor in the evaluation of that ‘‘conduit’’
status. 27

Liability For Hosting and Caching

A

fter explaining how paragraph 2.4(1)(b) is to be
interpreted, the Court went on to apply the provi-

sion to two common functions of Internet
intermediaries: hosting and caching. As to hosting, the
Board had found that a host server provider ‘‘merely
gives the customer [i.e., the content provider] the right to
place information on the servers’’ 28 and was not generally liable for communications transmitted by the host
server operator. The Court agreed with not imposing
liability on host server operators. It is implicit from the
Court’s decision that in performing such functions, they
generally act as mere conduits without the requisite
degree of knowledge of infringement to make them
liable.
Typically the host server provider will not monitor what is
posted to determine if it complies with copyright laws and
other legal restrictions. Given the vast amount of information posted, it is impractical in the present state of the
technology to require the host server provider to do so. In
any event, it is unrealistic to attribute to a provider an
expertise in copyright law sufficient to ‘‘lawyer’’ all of the
changing contents of its servers on an ongoing basis in the
absence of alleged infringements being brought to their
attention.
However, to the extent the host server provider has notice of
copyrighted material posted on its server, it may, as the
Board found, ‘‘respond to the complaint in accordance with
the [Canadian Association of Internet Providers] Code of
Conduct [which] may include requiring the customer to
remove the offending material through a ‘take down
notice’’’. . . . If the host server provider does not comply with
the notice, it may be held to have authorized communication of the copyright material, as hereinafter discussed. 29

The Court did not go further and speculate as to
whether an intermediary providing hosting services
might be liable for providing such services in circumstances where it knows or ought to know that the servers
it hosts contain infringing materials that are being communicated to the public.
As noted above, the majority in the Federal Court of
Appeal had concluded that the use of caching amounts
to a function falling outside paragraph 2.4(1)(b). This
finding was premised on that Court’s view that the protection of paragraph 2.4(1)(b) is only available ‘‘when,
without that person’s activity, communication in that
medium of telecommunication would not be practicable or, in all probability, would not have occurred’’. 30
That test was found by the Supreme Court to be a high
eligibility test, which could inhibit development of more
efficient means of telecommunication. The Court held
instead that something is ‘‘necessary’’, ‘‘which in the
accomplishment of a given object cannot be dispensed
with, or it may mean something reasonably useful and
proper, and of greater or lesser benefit or convenience ’’. 31
The Supreme Court noted that the Board had
found as a fact that in the early years of the Internet, ‘‘its
usefulness for the transmission of musical works was
limited by ‘the relatively high bandwidth required to
transmit audio files’’’. 32 It also found that this technical
limitation was addressed in part by using ‘‘caches’’ and
that the use of caches were content neutral and were
necessary to maximize the economy and cost-effective-
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ness of the Internet ‘‘conduit’’. As a consequence of the
finding that the use of caching technologies were ‘‘necessary’’ to Internet communications and that such communications ‘‘were content neutral’’, the Court held that
paragraph 2.4(1)( b ) applied to protect Internet
intermediaries from liability under paragraph 3(1)(f ) of
the Act.
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In the Board’s view, the means ‘‘necessary’’ under s. 2.4(1)(b)
were means that were content neutral and were necessary to
maximize the economy and cost-effectiveness of the
Internet ‘‘conduit’’. That interpretation, it seems to me, best
promotes ‘‘the public interest in the encouragement and
dissemination of works of the arts and intellect’’ (Théberge,
supra, at para. 30) without depriving copyright owners of
their legitimate entitlement. The creation of a ‘‘cache’’ copy,
after all, is a serendipitous consequence of improvements in
Internet technology, is content neutral, and in light of
s. 2.4(1)(b) of the Act ought not to have any legal bearing on
the communication between the content provider and the
end user.
As noted earlier, SOCAN successfully relied on the ‘‘exigencies of the Internet’’ to defeat the appellants’ argument that
they did not communicate a ‘‘musical work’’ but simply
packets of data that may or may not arrive in the correct
sequence. It is somewhat inconsistent, it seems to me, for
SOCAN then to deny the appellants the benefit of a similar
‘‘exigencies’’ argument. ‘‘Caching’’ is dictated by the need to
deliver faster and more economic service, and should not,
when undertaken only for such technical reasons, attract
copyright liability. 33

As with hosting, the Court did not speculate on the
potential liability of Internet intermediaries in circumstances in which the intermediary plays a role in the
selection of the content to be cached, or where the intermediary is or could be aware of the content that is
cached.
The decision of the Court on the liability of Internet
intermediaries for caching under paragraph 3(1)(f ) of the
Act is consistent with laws in the U.S. and England,
which do not impose liability on Internet intermediaries
unless there is some element of volition or causation that
is lacking where the intermediary’s system is merely used
by a third party to create a copy or to effect a transmission. 34 It is also consistent with legislation in other countries that exempts Internet Service Providers from copyright liability for hosting and caching. 35

Authorizing Infringement By
Providing a Hosting Service

T

he Supreme Court of Canada generally agreed with
the Federal Court of Appeal on the issue of the
liability of Internet intermediaries for authorizing
infringement. The Court observed that when massive
amounts of non-copyrighted material are accessible to
the end user, it is not possible to impute to the Internet
Service Provider, based solely on the provision of
Internet facilities, an authority to download copyrighted
material as opposed to non-copyrighted material. Further, the knowledge that someone might be using neu-

tral technology used by Internet intermediaries to provide services to violate copyright is not necessarily
sufficient to constitute authorization, as this requires a
demonstration that the defendant did give approval to,
sanction, permit, favour, or encourage the infringing conduct. The Court observed, however, that copyright liability may well attach if the activities of the Internet
Service Provider cease to be content neutral (e.g. if it has
notice that a content provider has posted infringing
material on its system and fails to take remedial action).
The Court’s reasons on this issue were expressed as follows:
The operation of the Internet is obviously a good deal more
complicated than the operation of a photocopier, but it is
true here, as it was in the CCH case, that when massive
amounts of non-copyrighted material are accessible to the
end user, it is not possible to impute to the Internet Service
Provider, based solely on the provision of Internet facilities,
an authority to download copyrighted material as opposed
to non-copyrighted material. . . .
The knowledge that someone might be using neutral technology to violate copyright (as with the photocopier in the
CCH case) is not necessarily sufficient to constitute authorization, which requires a demonstration that the defendant
did ‘‘[g]ive approval to; sanction, permit; favour, encourage’’
. . . the infringing conduct. I agree that notice of infringing
content, and a failure to respond by ‘‘taking it down’’ may in
some circumstances lead to a finding of ‘‘authorization’’.
However, that is not the issue before us. Much would
depend on the specific circumstances. An overly quick inference of ‘‘authorization’’ would put the Internet Service Provider in the difficult position of judging whether the copyright objection is well founded, and to choose between
contesting a copyright action or potentially breaching its
contract with the content provider. A more effective remedy
to address this potential issue would be the enactment by
Parliament of a statutory ‘‘notice and take down’’ procedure
as has been done in the European Community and the
United States.
In sum, I agree with the Court of Appeal that ‘‘authorization’’ could be inferred in a proper case but all would
depend on the facts. 36

Territorial Scope of the Copyright
Act

I

nternet communications and the growth of e-commerce raises significant conflicts-of-laws questions as
to the situs of conduct. The Internet is profoundly antispacial and negates traditional geographic boundaries. As
a result, numerous cases around the globe have had to
consider jurisdictional issues arising from Internet communications, including issues of personal, regulatory, and
even constitutional jurisdiction. 37 In the Tariff 22 case,
the Court expressly recognized the jurisdictional
dilemmas caused by the Internet, and expressly acknowledged that its was deciding the case before it ‘‘with an
eye to this broader context’’.
The issue of the proper balance in matters of copyright plays
out against the much larger conundrum of trying to apply
national laws to a fast-evolving technology that in essence
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respects no national boundaries . . . The availability of child
pornography on the Internet is a matter of serious concern.
E-Commerce is growing. Internet liability is thus a vast field
where the legal harvest is only beginning to ripen. It is with
an eye to this broader context that the relatively precise
questions raised by the Copyright Board must be considered . . .
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Canada clearly has a significant interest in the flow of information in and out of the country . . . A failure to recognize
such jurisdiction ‘‘would have serious consequences in other
areas of law relevant to the Internet, including Canada’s
ability to deal with criminal and civil liability for objectionable communications entering the country from abroad.’’ 38

‘‘The Internet presents a particular challenge to
national copyright laws which are typically territorial in
nature.’’ 39 Parliament’s power to legislate with extraterritorial effect is well settled as a matter of Canadian law. 40
‘‘However, while the Parliament of Canada, unlike the
legislatures of the Provinces, has the legislative competence to enact laws having extraterritorial effect, it is
presumed not to intend to do so, in the absence of clear
words or necessary implication to the contrary’’. 41 This
presumption flows from the principle of territoriality, a
tenet of international law. Because each state is sovereign
in its own territory, it is presumed that states hesitate to
exercise jurisdiction over matters that may take place in
the territory of other states. 42 But, as noted above, this
presumption is rebuttable where the contrary intention
is expressly stated or implied by the legislation. 43
A central issue raised in the Tariff 22 case concerned
when a communication of a musical work was considered to have occurred in Canada. According to the Copyright Board, 44 to occur in Canada, a communication
must originate from a server located in Canada on which
content has been placed. As summarized above, the
Board held that the place of origin of the request, the
location of the person posting the content, and the location of the original Web site are irrelevant. It also held
that posting content on a server located outside of
Canada does not constitute a communication of the
work to the public in Canada. However, the Board left
open the issue of whether an entity that provides content
outside Canada with the intention to communicate it
specifically to recipients in Canada is communicating it
in Canada.
The views expressed by the Copyright Board in the
Tariff 22 case, as to what activities need occur in Canada
for a communication to the public to be complete, were
criticized on appeal by the Federal Court of Appeal. The
Federal Court of Appeal expressed the opinion that since
the very notion of communication requires a communicator and an intended recipient, it was wrong for the
Board to have concluded that the location of the communication should solely be determined by that of the
host server. This was especially the case as the Board had
found that the Internet communications under consideration were only ever affected at the request of the end
user. According to the Court, the proper test to apply to
determine where the communication occurs is the ‘‘real
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and substantial connection’’ test. That test could be
applied to determine the location of the infringing
activity, as well as the location of the infringing activity of
authorizing a communication that occurs when a content provider posts copyright material on a host server.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada also
disagreed with the Board’s view that a communication
that does not originate in Canada does not occur in
Canada. The Court expressed the view that this is ‘‘too
rigid and mechanical a test’’. According to the Court, an
Internet communication that crosses one or more
national boundaries ‘‘occurs’’ in more than one country,
at a minimum the country of transmission and the
country of reception. At the end of the transmission, the
end user has a work in his or her possession that was not
there before. The work has, necessarily, been communicated, irrespective of its point of origin. The Court, therefore, concluded that the Copyright Board erred in law
when it ignored all connecting factors other than the
location of the host server for the purpose of identifying
communications that occur in Canada.
Having found that the Board erred in holding that
the only relevant connection between Canada and the
communication is the location of the host server, the
Court next had to determine, as a matter of statutory
interpretation, what connecting factors are sufficient to
impose copyright liability for transborder communications. In considering this issue, the Court noted that in
the absence of clear words to the contrary, courts presume that Parliament does not intend its legislation to
receive extraterritorial application. Further, the Court
recognized that copyright law respects the territorial
principle, reflecting the implementation of a ‘‘web of
interlinking international treaties’’ 45 based on the principle of national treatment. 46 The Court expressed the
opinion that these principles could be satisfied by
applying the ‘‘real and substantial connection’’ test to
determine whether there is a sufficient connection
between Canada and transborder communication for
Canada to apply its law consistent with the ‘‘principles of
order and fairness’’.
The ‘‘real and substantial connection’’ test had previously been adopted and developed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in numerous cases. 47 From the outset,
however, this test had been viewed as an appropriate
way to prevent overreaching, and to restrict the exercise
of jurisdiction over extraterritorial and transnational
transactions, in a manner consistent with the principles
of international comity, order, and fairness. 48 Historically,
the test was not applied as a principle of statutory construction or legislative jurisdiction to achieve certainty,
ease of application, and predictability in determining the
substantive law to be applied to a dispute. The test
applied only to the courts. 49 As noted, above, however, in
the Tariff 22 case, the Supreme Court applied the ‘‘real
and substantial connection’’ test to determining the
applicability of the Copyright Act to Internet communi-
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cations that have international participants. The use of
this test will undoubtedly be applied in future copyright
cases. Further, in view of the Court’s statement that the
case was being decided ‘‘with an eye’’ to the broader
context of Internet liability, it can be expected that the
real and substantial link test will be applied in a variety
of other cases involving trans-border communications.
The Court observed that whether or not a real and
substantial connection exists in any particular fact situation will turn on the facts of a particular transmission. In
this regard, the Court noted that foreign content providers whose music is telecommunicated to a Canadian
end user will not automatically be subject to liability; a
content provider will not necessarily be immunized
from copyright liability by virtue only of the fact that it
employs a host server outside the country; and conversely, a host server does not attract liability just because
it is located in Canada. The decision of the Court raises
the spectre of imposition of copyright liability on a single

telecommunication in both the state of transmission and
the state of reception. The Court recognized this potential problem but observed that ‘‘as with other fields of
overlapping liability (taxation for example), the answer
lies in the making of international or bilateral agreements, not in national courts straining to find some jurisdictional infirmity in either State’’. 50

Conclusion

T

he Tariff 22 case is the most significant case to be
decided to date in Canada in the area of liability for
the communication of works over the Internet. It is also
the first of what will undoubtedly be further cases to be
decided by the Supreme Court and other Canadian
courts on the applicability of the real and substantial link
test to Internet communications.
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